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THE INCLUSION OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
UNDER SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT
SCHOOL BOARD OF NASSAU COUNTY,
FLA. v. ARLINE
Discrimination against the handicapped has long plagued the United
States.1 Early attempts of the federal government to address problems
facing the handicapped focused on assisting American War veterans.2
The federal government responded to employment discrimination
against the handicapped by passing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 19733 (the Act).4 The Act imposes liability for discrimination
on employers receiving federal funding.5 Litigation first centered on
1. Citing Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulations imple-
menting § 504, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D. Minn.) stated: "Certain kinds of dis-
crimination have become so ingrained in our society they almost enjoy respectability."
123 CONG. REc. 13,515 (daily ed. May 4, 1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
2. In 1920, Congress enacted the Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (re-
pealed in 1973) to "assist veterans returning from World War I in the areas of training,
placement, counseling and rehabilitation services." Cohen, The State of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 65 IOWA L. REv. 446, 448 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Cohen].
3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982)).
4. One commentator referred to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act as:
a program of comprehensive services and genuine priorities on behalf of the handi-
capped... emphasiz[ing] research in special problem areas, innovation in federal
programs, and extension of services to a broader class of disabled persons ....
Mhe most far-reaching portion of the Act... contains a group of provisions
designed to combat prejudice-inspired treatment of the handicapped in employ-
ment and federally funded programs.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 449.
5. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act reads in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
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determining whether the Act provides a private cause of action 6 and
subsequently focused on defining the Act's terminology.' In School
Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline,8 the United States Supreme
Court defined the term "handicap" 9 and held that an individual suffer-
ing from a contagious disease ° may be considered handicapped under
the terms of the Rehabilitation Act.11
In Arline, elementary school teacher Gene Arline sought protection
as a handicapped individual under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 2 In 1978 Arline suffered a relapse of tuberculosis, 3 and the
School Board discharged her, fearing the risk of contagion.14 At trial,
6. See, eg., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); U.S. v.
Cabrini Medical Center, 479 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Carmi v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 471 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1977).
7. See, eg., School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987);
Vickers v. Veteran's Administration, 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
8. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
9. The Court also examined Arline's status as "otherwise qualified." Arline, 107 S.
Ct. at 1125. See supra note 5 and infra note 28.
10. According to medical records examined by the district court, Arline's first stay
in the hospital for tuberculosis occurred in 1957. Her 1977 and 1978 cultures revealed
that the disease was again active. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Webster's Dictionary
defines tuberculosis as "a highly variable communicable disease of man... character-
ized by toxic symptoms... which in man primarily affect the lungs." WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (9th ed. 1986).
11. The school system received funding under both Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 and in the form of "impact aid"
under 20 U.S.C. § 237. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Because the school received federal
funding, it is bound by the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
12. The 1973 definition of handicapped appears in § 504 of the Act and in the
amended 1978 version as § 794. When referring to the main purpose of the Act, some
courts refer to § 504 and some to § 794. Section 794 is the codified version of the Act.
The 1978 amendment to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped individ-
ual as:
[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially lim-
its one or more of such a person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1978).
13. Arline first contracted the disease in 1957. For approximately twenty years the
disease remained in remission. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
14. The Nassau County School Board held a hearing at the end of the 1978-79
school year and dismissed elementary school teacher Arline " 'not because she has done




Arline argued that because she suffered from tuberculosis,1 5 she was a
handicapped person under the terms of the Act.16 The District Court
for the Middle District of Florida held that the Rehabilitation Act does
not include contagious diseases' in its definition of handicapped."8 In
addition, even if handicapped, Arline was not "otherwise qualified"19
to teach elementary school."
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,21 accepting
Arline's contention that she was handicapped22 under section 504. To
determine whether the infectious nature of her disease precluded her
from being "otherwise qualified"'23 and whether the School Board
might have avoided Arline's dismissal through reasonable accommoda-
tion,24 the court remanded the case to the district court.25 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the circuit court,26
holding that Arline was handicapped under section 504.27 The Court
15. See supra note 10.
16. See supra note 12.
17. Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines contagious as "communicable, transmis-
sible by contact with the sick .... " STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 315 (5th
Lawyers' ed. 1982).
18. The Court of Appeals, citing the District Court, stated that "[i]t is difficult for
this court to conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to be included within
the definition of a handicapped person." Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, 772
F.2d 759, 763 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
19. The terms of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination against any "other-
wise qualified" handicapped individual on the basis of his or her disability alone. See
supra note 5. For the definition of "otherwise qualified," see infra note 59.
20. Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
21. 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
22. Appeals Court Justice Vance wrote:
The language of these provisions [the Rehabilitation Act] in every respect supports
a conclusion that persons with contagious diseases are within the coverage of sec-
tion 504.... A person with tuberculosis is, when afflicted with the disease, one who
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits ... major life
activities.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 764.
23. Id at 765.
24. Employers have an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations
for a handicapped employee. "A recipient [of federal funding] shall make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
handicapped applicant or employee .. " 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986).
25. Arline, 772 F.2d at 765.
26. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126.
27. Id at 1132.
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remanded the case to the district court to determine the actual risks
posed by Arline's disease and whether Arline was "otherwise qualified"
for her position.28
Through the Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended tO create a com-
prehensive program aimed at the effective assimilation of the handi-
capped into mainstream society.29 To further that end, Congress
passed the Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978.30 The legislative history reveals
Congress' intent to provide the same remedies for the handicapped"
that protect employees from discrimination based on race, sex, and na-
tional origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
28. The Supreme Court held:
Because of the paucity of factual findings by the District Court, we, like the Court
of Appeals, are unable at this stage of the proceedings to resolve whether Arline is
otherwise qualified for her job. The District Court made no findings as to the
duration and severity of Arline's condition, nor as to the probability that she would
transmit the disease. Nor did the court determine whether Arline was contagious
at the time she was discharged....
Id at 1131.
29. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 626.
30. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602 § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1978)).
31. Jacobs, Employment Discrimination and the Handicapped: Some New Teeth for
a "Paper Tiger"--The Rehabilitation Act of 1978, 23 How. L.J. 481, 486 (1980).
32. Section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act provides that the remedies available
in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(k) (1982), are available to any com-
plaint brought under the Rehabilitation Act.
Remedies permitted under section 2000e-5(f)-(k) include:
(f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person aggrieved; precon-
ditions; procedure; appointment of attorney; payment of fees, costs, or secur-
ity; intervention; stay of Federal proceedings; action for appropriate
temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge; jurisdic-
tion and venue of United States courts; designation of judge to hear and deter-
mine case; assignment of case for hearing; expedition of case; appointment of
master.
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back
pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders ....
(i) Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial orders.
(0) Appeals.
(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for costs.
1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(k) (1982).
The purpose of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was to eliminate from programs
and activities receiving federal funding discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 287.
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Although the Rehabilitation Act presents a multitude of issues,33
those most pertinent to the Arline decision are the meanings of "handi-
capped" and "otherwise qualified,"'34 and whether the Act includes
contagious diseases within its protection.35
The Act's 1973 definition of handicapped focused on the extent to
which the presence of a mental or physical disability substantially ham-
pered employability.36 The 1978 amendments expanded the definition
of "handicapped" 37 to include disabilities resulting from physical or
mental impairments, either actual or perceived. 38 Through this ex-
panded definition, Congress sought to combat employers' fear of and
unfamiliarity with the handicapped. 39 To determine whether an indi-
vidual is handicapped, the Arline Court examined the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) statutory guidelines defining
the terms "physical impairment" and "major life activities."'  These
33. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
34. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Strathie v. De-
partment of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
35. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
36. The 1973 Act defines a handicapped individual as "any individual who (A) has
a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a sub-
stantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms
of employability from vocational rehabilitation services ... " Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 7, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
37. The change in the definition of "handicapped" reflected Congress' intention to
broaden the Act's application: "It was clearly the intent.., of Congress in adopting...
Section 504 (nondiscrimination) that the term 'handicapped individual' in [this]
[s]ection... [is] not to be narrowly limited to employment ...." Note, Judicial Limita-
tions on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 26 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989, 994
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Limitations]. The 1978 version excluded any refer-
ence to employment and did not limit the applicability of the Act to those employers
receiving federal funding primarily to promote employment. Id. at 990.
38. See supra note 12.
39. The legislative history of the 1978 version of the Act reflected Congress' recog-
nition of public attitudes toward the handicapped:
Individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from schools and educational
programs, barred from employment or are underemployed because of archaic atti-
tudes and laws.... Not the least of the problems is the fact that the American
people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to difficulties confronted [by] in-
dividuals with handicaps. The failure to involve individuals with handicaps in the
development of programs which affect their lives certainly fosters this problem.
Pub. L. No. 93-516, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1862.
40. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs Receiving or Benefit-
ing from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (1987).
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regulations guide courts interpreting section 504.41
In E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall4 2 the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii focused on the meaning of "handicapped"
under the Rehabilitation Act.4  Prior litigation of Black' relied on
interpretations of "handicapped" that were either too broad4 5 or too
narrow, 46 diluting the effectiveness of the Act.4 7 Both the congres-
sional intent to develop a comprehensive statute4 ' and the desire to
effectuate the Act's purposes compelled a broad reading of "handi-
capped."4 9 The court defined a handicapped individual as "one who
has a physical or mental disability which for such individual consti-
41. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
42. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980). Construction contractor Black denied em-
ployment to Crosby, a union employee, after a series of physical examinations revealed
he suffered from a congenital back ailment. The court stated, "The Rehabilitation Act
require[d] the employer to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employ-
ment, notwithstanding that the employee suffered from a condition that weakened, di-
minished, restricted, or otherwise damaged health and physical and mental activities
..... " Id at 1089.
43. The court adopted the Rehabilitation Act's § 706(7)(B) definition of handi-
capped. See supra note 12.
44. The Administrative Law Judge (AJ) who heard Crosby's complaint concluded
that Congress meant to cover only persons with the most disabling diseases, thus nar-
rowly construing the term "handicapped." O.F.C.C.P. v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1624, 1632 (1979). The AIU based his conclusion on guide-
lines from the Social Security Administration, which defined handicap as "the inability
to perform 'substantial gainful activity.'" 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1981). The Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards, who next heard the case, O.F.C.C.P. v.
E.E. Black, Ltd., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1624, 1626 (1979), defined handicap
as a "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities" (citing statutory language of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(b)(i)
(1976 and Supp. 111 1979)). See Bogaard, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Who Is
Handicapped Under Federal Law?, 16 U.S.F.L. Rv. 653, 667 (1982).
45. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099.
46. Id at 1098.
47. Id
48. See supra note 4.
49. The Court said: "[G]iven the legislative history of the Act, persons of common
intelligence should have had fair warning that the term impairment means 'any condi-
tion which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health
or physical or mental activity.'" Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1098. The Black court stated:
"Words are not precise symbols and statutory definitions are often unable to precisely
define and cover all possible situations .... Congress was not required to spell out in
detail every possible condition or abnormality that could constitute an impairment....




tutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment... ."" The
court stressed the need for a case by case application of its definition to
individuals involved in litigation under the Act. 1
The Black court's broad reading 2 recognizes Congress' intent to in-
clude individuals with obvious impairments as well as those who are
merely perceived as impaired. 3 This definition does not, however,
render the term improper or unconstitutionally vague.54 Black 55 thus
articulated the intent of Congress to include within the Act's protec-
tions" employees thought to be impaired.57
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,58 a case of first impres-
sion before the Supreme Court, Justice Powell's majority opinion fo-
cused on the meaning of "otherwise qualified."59 The Court refused to
allow the college to assume arbitrarily that a handicap renders an indi-
vidual unable to function and therefore preclude that individual from
participation in a federally funded program or activity.' ° Davis alleged
that Southeastern Community College denied her admission to its
nursing program because of her hearing impairment.6 ' She claimed
that section 504 of the Act compelled the school to restructure its pro-
50. Id. at 1099.
51. Id. at 1100.
52. See supra note 49.
53. See supra note 12.
54. See supra note 49.
55. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982).
57. See Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HoFmSRA L. REv. 11
(1985-86).
58. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
59. Consistent with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Justice Powell wrote: "An
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in
spite of his handicap." Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
60. According to Justice Powell, "[Section 504] requires only that an 'otherwise
qualified handicapped individual' not be excluded from participation in a federally
funded program 'solely by reason of his handicap,' indicating ... mere possession of a
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particu-
lar context." Id. at 405.
61. Davis suffered from a bilateral, sensory-neural hearing loss which prevented her
from discriminating among sounds sufficiently to understand normal spoken speech."
Id. at 401. The Supreme Court, citing the district court, 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C.
1976), found:
Even with a hearing aid respondent [Davis] cannot understand speech directed to
her except through lipreading.... [Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her
from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profes-
1988]
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gram to accommodate her by dispensing with its requirement of effec-
tive oral communication. 62 The Court found that both the language
and the history of the Act failed to require an employer or educational
institution to substantially change a program's requirements63 to allow
a handicapped individual to participate." 4 As a result, employers must
reasonably accommodate "otherwise qualified" handicapped individu-
als, but need not dispense with qualifications crucial to job
performance.
In Strathie v. Department of Transportation61 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a handicapped indi-
vidual unable to fulfill all of a program's requirements may still be
"otherwise qualified" for the program.6 6 The court based its holding
on the premise that refusal to modify program qualifications may be
sion.... Of particular concern to the court.., is the potential of danger to future
patients in such situations.
Davis, 442 U.S. at 403.
62. Id at 407.
63. Davis claimed that HEW regulations required Southeastern to modify their pro-
gram requirements to accommodate the handicapped. Id. at 408. These proposed mod-
ifications include sign language interpreters, individual faculty supervision, and
dispensing with certain required courses. The Court claimed that such a fundamental
alteration went beyond the type of modification that HEW required. In support of its
position, the Court cited the HEW regulations:
(a) Academic requirements. A recipient [of federal funds] to which this subpart
applies shall make such modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary
to ensure that such requiiements do not discriminate or have the effect of discrimi-
nating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified handicapped application or
student.
Davis, 442 U.S. at 408-09, citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978).
64. In finding that Southeastern did not discriminate against Davis, the Court
stated:
Nothing in the language or history of § 504 reflects an intention to limit the free-
dom of an educational institution to require reasonable physical qualification for
admission .... Nor has there been any showing ... that any action short of a
substantial change in Southeastern's program would render unreasonable the quali-
fications it imposed.
Davis, 442 U.S. at 414.
65. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983). The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(DOT) denied employment to Strathie, a hearing-impaired bus driver. The denial,
based on DOT regulations, mandated that drivers must have "[n]o hearing loss greater
than 25 decibels at frequencies of 500-1,000 and 2,000 in the better ear without a hear-
ing aid." The court found that with his hearing aid, Strathie's audio capacity was
within the statutory requirements. 716 F.2d at 228.
66. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230, citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1981) (in reversing the district court's grant of injunctive relief to a student who sought
to be re-admitted to medical school, the court held that the student, who misrepresented
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/17
ARLINE
unreasonable and thus discriminatory. 67 The court used two factors to
assess the reasonableness of an employer's refusal to accommodate a
handicapped individual:6  the extent to which an employer would
have to modify the essential nature of the program and the extent of
the financial burden resulting from the modification. 69 As a result of
Strathie, job requirements used to evaluate whether an individual is
"otherwise qualified" must be essential to the performance of the job.
In some cases, failure to modify those requirements may be
discriminatory.
School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline7 ° is the Supreme
Court's first attempt to define "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation
Act.7 ' Acknowledging that discrimination against the handicapped
occurs because of both real and imagined disabilities,7 2 Justice Brennan
found that the Act's 1978 definition7 3 of "handicapped" protects indi-
her health to the medical admissions board, was handicapped but not otherwise quali-
fied within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
67. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230.
68. Md
69.[l] We believe the following standard effectively reconciles these competing con-
siderations: A handicapped individual who cannot meet all of a program's require-
ments is not otherwise qualified if there is a factual basis in the record reasonably
demonstrating that accommodating that individual would require either a modifi-
cation of the essential nature of the program, or impose an undue burden on the
recipient of federal funds.
Id at 231.
70. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
71. Although other courts have defined handicap, this is a case of first impression
for the Supreme Court. Id at 1132. Other courts have dealt with the issue of who is
handicapped in various ways. See generally Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp.
739, 745 (D.C. Cal. 1984) (refusing to designate as handicapped an airline attendant
who lost his job because of voluntary bodybuilding that caused him to exceed the air-
line's weight requirements; failure to secure one job fails to impair a major life activity);
Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 78 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (complainant within the
Act's provisions when the City of Tampa failed to hire him because of his past history of
epilepsy, even though he suffered no greater chance of having a seizure than any other
member of the general population); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(past drug addiction within the Act's definition of handicapped since it substantially
limits major life activities, and past addiction falls within the definition of "having a
record of such impairment").
72. The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act "preclude discrimination
against [a] person who has a record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [but
who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all." Id at 1126-27; Stewart, Good
News for AIDS Victims, Refugees, May 1 A.B.A.J. 50 (1987) [hereinafter cited as
Stewart].
73. See supra note 12.
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viduals afflicted with contagious diseases," such as Arline.75 The ma-
jority also considered whether the risks from a contagious disease
preclude an individual from being "otherwise qualified."76 The Court
believed Arline's record established that her illness fit into both the
HEW regulations" and Congress' statutory framework.78
Next, the Court considered the School Board's contention that the
contagious nature of a disease is distinguishable7 9 from its physical ef-
fect on the handicapped individual. Such a distinction would allow an
employer to refuse to hire someone who could spread the disease with-
out personally suffering any physical impairment. The Court noted
that the Act's legislative history" failed to justify such a distinction. 1
74. The Supreme Court in Arline wrote:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious health
threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the
coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases. Such
exclusion would mean that those accused of being contagious would never have the
opportunity to have their condition evaluated in the light of medical evidence and a
determination made as to whether they were "otherwise qualified."
Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1130.
75. In determining whether an individual is handicapped, the Court relied upon
regulations promulgated by HEW defining physical impairment as "[a]ny physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; re-
spiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-uri-
nary; hemic and lymphatic; skin and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(1) (1987).
The regulations define major life activities as "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987).
76. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1130.
77. According to the medical testimony at trial, Arline suffered from tuberculosis
"in an acute form in such a degree that it affected her respiratory system." Id. at 1127.
This fits into the HEW definition of major life activity (breathing), 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987), and establishes that Arline had a physiological condition and a
physical impairment, as defined by HEW. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126.
78. The Court found that the serious nature of Arline's illness satisfied the statutory
requirements of proving "handicap":
(i) her impairment, serious enough to warrant hospitalization, established that a
major life activity was substantially limited;
(ii) Arline's 1957 hospitalization for tuberculosis established a "record of
impairment";
(iii) the fact that Arline was dismissed established that the school board regarded
her as having an impairment ".... not because of her diminished physical capabili-
ties, but because of the threat that her relapses ... posed to others."
Id at 1127-28.
79. Id. at 1128.
80. Under 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1976), individuals "regarded as having such
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/17
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The Court believed that allowing contagion to remove an individual
from the Act's protections would defeat the purpose of ensuring that
discrimination against the handicapped does not result from fear and
ignorance.8
2
To determine whether Arline was "otherwise qualified"8 " to teach
elementary school, the Court examined what reasonable accommoda-
tions 4 the School Board could have made to avoid her dismissal.8 5
Since the district court suffered from a dearth of information 86 regard-
ing the actual risks 7 to Arline's students, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the lower court should have undertaken extensive fact-
finding.8" Due to this lack of information, the Court was unable to
[physical or mental] impairment" are protected against discrimination. Justice Brennan
believed this provision established Congress' concern about the effect a disease has on
others as well as on the handicapped individual. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1128.
81. The Court held: "[lit would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease and use
that distinction to justify discrimination." Id
82. See infra note 104.
83. See supra note 5.
84. Justice Brennan, citing Davis stated: "When a handicapped person is not able to
perform the essential functions of the job, the Court must consider whether any 'reason-
able accommodation' by the employer would enable the handicapped person to perform
those functions...." Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17. Accommodation is unreasonable
if it imposes "undue financial or administrative burdens" on a grantee. Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
85. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
86. The district court's oral opinion made no findings regarding:
1) duration and severity of Arline's condition;
2) probability of transmitting the disease;
3) existence of active disease at the time the school board discharged Arline;
4) whether the school board could have reasonably accommodated her.
Id.
87. Citing the transcript of respondent's oral argument, the Court acknowledged
that an individual who poses a "significant" risk to others because of the contagious
nature of her disease is not "otherwise qualified" if reasonable accommodation would
not eliminate the risks to others. lId at 1131 n.16.
88. Citing the American Medical Association Amicus Curiae 19, the Court outlined
the factors the district court should consider in a fact finding inquiry of the actual risk
of contagion:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medi-
cal knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of
the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
IcL at 1131.
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conclude whether Arline was an "otherwise qualified" individual and
remanded the case to the district court. 89
Justice Rehnquist's dissent focused on the lack of express language
in the Act regarding conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds
and the status of contagious diseases.90 He opined that the absence of
specific statutory language and the existence of state public health stat-
utes9 1 to protect the public from communicable diseases required a
narrow reading of the Act.92 The dissent stated that instead of found-
ing its inclusion of contagious diseases on the Act's statutory lan-
guage,93 the majority relied on its own sense of right and wrong94 in
the treatment of those dismissed from employment because of their
handicap.
The implications of Arline9  extend beyond protecting individuals
dismissed from their jobs because they are merely regarded by others as
handicapped. 96 The majority's holding broadened the scope of the
Act.97 Arline prohibits government-funded employers from discrimi-
nating against qualified individuals because of actual or perceived
handicaps.98
The Court's extension of the definition of "handicapped" to include
contagious diseases is especially relevant today, since the mere mention
of the contagious disease Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) creates panic. The Court reserved99 discussion of the AIDS
issue by refusing to classify as handicapped those individuals who carry
89. Id Justice Brennan wrote: "Because of the paucity of factual findings ... we
... are unable at this stage to resolve whether Arline is 'otherwise qualified' for her
job." Id.
90. Id at 1132.
91. Id. at 1132 n.2.
92. Regarding state statutory regulation of public health, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
"When faced with such extensive regulation, this Court has declined to read the Reha-
bilitation Act expansively." Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1132, 1133.
93. Justice Rehnquist cited Pemhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17 (1981), and wrote that "[w]here Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously." Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1132.
94. "[T]he Court today... rest[ed] its holding on its own sense of fairness and
implied support from the Act." Id at 1132.




99. Id at 1128 n.7.
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the AIDS virus but lack physical impairment. 1°0 By reserving judg-
ment1°1 on the inclusion of AIDS under the Rehabilitation Act, the
Court left open the possibility that, if risks to others can be reduced by
reasonable accommodation,' °2 an employee with the disease may still
be an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual protected by the
Act.103 Such a finding relies on a broad reaiing of the Act and its
purposes. 'o
Justice Rehnquist's dissent would preclude this broad interpretation.
His argument for a narrow reading of the Act,'0 5 however, ignores its
purpose.'" Further, the Arline dissent contains the very attitudes that
Congress sought to remedy through the Rehabilitation Act.107
The Arline decision preserves the intent behind the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and its 1978 Amendments108 In some cases, disabilities
are readily apparent and therefore efforts to eradicate prejudicial reac-
tions are easier to develop. On the other hand, it is often difficult to
eliminate discrimination based on impairments that are not visible,
such as AIDS. The difficulties inherent in identifying certain disabili-
ties and correcting prejudices formed by real or imagined handicaps
bolster support for a broad reading of the Rehabilitation Act.
Melissa G. Eisenberg
100. Id.
101. Id at 1123 n.7.
102. Id at 1131 n.16.
103. Designation as "otherwise qualified" presumes the handicapped individual is
"qualified in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
104. Focusing on the purpose behind the Rehabilitation Act, the Court wrote:
Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to ensure that
handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others. By amending the definition of
"handicapped individual" to include not only those who are actually physically
impaired, but also regarded as impaired and who, as a result are substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment.
Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1129.
105. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 4.
107. See supra note 39.
108. See supra note 104.
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